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Although forbearance has been associated with more costly financial crises, a trigger-
happy approach to closing weak banks could also precipitate an avoidable systemic 
collapse. In sophisticated regulatory environments, there can be net benefits from at 
least occasional acts of forbearance.  But we argue that three key structural 
weaknesses in developing countries suggest that their regulators should have less 
forbearance discretion.  This is because financial systems in developing countries tend 
to have worse information, less interdependence and greater agency problems.  SHOULD BANK SUPERVISORS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
EXERCISE MORE OR LESS FORBEARANCE? 
 
 
1.  Introduction and overview 
  
1.1  Introduction 
Recent credit market pressures in several advanced economies have led to bank 
rescues, and to relaxed criteria for liquidity loans, and have re-awakened old debates 
on forbearance.  But even if regulators in advanced economies can successfully 
forbear to intervene undercapitalized institutions without unduly damaging moral 
hazard consequences, it is less clear what the lessons for developing countries should 
be. 
 
This paper argues that greater agency and information problems, and lower structural 
interdependence within financial markets, in developing countries argue for less 
regulatory discretion.  
 
1.2  Overview 
Forbearance got a bad name during the US Savings and Loan crisis. Explicit 
relaxations in capital standards as well as lengthy periods of grace designed to allow 
undercapitalized or insolvent S&Ls to continue in operation were followed by 
massive abuses, involving excessive risk-taking, looting and fraud. 
 
The reaction of numerous commentators to these relatively well-documented events 
was to call for the elimination of discretion and a zero-tolerance policy for capital 
adequacy.  Steps in that direction were adopted in the US under the FDICIA 
legislation, though the legislation fell well short of the absolutism advocated by some. 
 
Indeed, there is some cross-country empirical evidence suggesting that, for crises 
where data on the total fiscal costs are available and, where enough is known about 
the policy response to be able to say whether or not there was forbearance, those 
countries whose regulators have exercised forbearance have experienced more costly 
crises.   
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But the fragility of a stressed financial system and the imperfection of the rules 
defining capital and other regulatory standards imply that unthinking adherence to 
mechanical rules in a crisis situation could have large systemic consequences.  That is 
why regulators in advanced economies have retained and exercised discretion.   
 
It is one thing to argue that a sophisticated regulatory structure operating in an 
accountable and independent way should be able to improve on a mechanical rules-
based system, by adapting enforcement policy to contingencies, thereby avoiding a 
regulator-induced deepening of an incipient crisis (Goodhart, 2007, makes a 
convincing case).  But what of regulators in developing countries where these 
preconditions do not prevail, and in particular where agency and information 
problems are worse and banking systems less interdependent. Is tying the regulators’ 
hands more or less likely to worsen the financial stability experience in such 
environments? 
 
There is surprisingly little theoretical guidance as to whether these differences, 
between them, argue for or against less regulatory discretion. The severity of agency 
problems presumably call for less agent discretion.  But the problems with accounting 
data seem to cut both ways: on the one hand they make it easier to conceal regulatory 
deficiencies; on the other hand accounting data might seem to be too unreliable to be 
used as the basis for a mechanical intervention rule.  The lower degree of intermediary 
interdependence may reduce the risk of regulatory action precipitating damaging 
contagion, but evidence here is particularly thin. 
 
Since data deficiencies are at the heart of this question, it is especially difficult to 
bring credible quantification to the debate.  Even after bank failures crystallize, 
reliable data is scarce.  In particular, obtaining a convincing measure of the frequency 
and scale of crises that were avoided through forbearance is elusive. 
 
Given that a zero-tolerance policy cannot be robustly defended on empirical or 
theoretical grounds, but taking into account that contagion is less likely to be a 
problem, policy for developing countries should be nuanced.  Enforcement need not 
be mechanical, but there should be a stronger presumption of enforcement in 
  2developing countries, especially where information, agency and governance problems 
are thought to be severe. Measures to strengthen accountability and transparency of 
regulatory action should be adopted, together with a tightening of capital requirements 
to take account of the accounting uncertainties. 
 
1.3  Outline 
This paper begins (Section 2) by reviewing the main conceptual issues identified in 
the theoretical literature on capital adequacy rules and enforcement. These include 
analysis of the impact of regulation on (i) the ex ante discipline effect of bankers’ 
expectations of forbearance on their incentives to take risks; (ii) the danger of a strict 
closure rule resulting in what is ex post inefficient liquidation; (iii) contagion effects; 
and (iv) the effects of alternative assignments of enforcement between different public 
agencies.  The concerns of this literature may, however, be somewhat misplaced when 
it comes to developing countries.   
 
Sections 3 to 5 discuss (and present some evidence concerning) three important 
dimensions of the overall environment for regulation where conditions in developing 
countries seem far different to those in advanced economies. First, information is 
extremely poor: large accounting surprises are the norm rather than the exception 
(Section 3). Second, financial intermediaries display less interdependence (Section 4).  
Third, agency problems – affecting the performance of regulators as agents of the 
public interest – are more severe (Section 5).   
 
Section 6 presents theoretical considerations why these three distinctive agency, 
information and structural features of developing country financial systems tilt the 
balance of advantage against forbearance.  It draws on a simple model sketched in 
Appendix 2.   
 
Section 7 reviews and extends the empirical literature on the contribution of 
forbearance to banking crisis costs, pointing to the difficulties in obtaining decisive 
conclusions from available data.  Concluding remarks are in Section 8.  
 
 
  32  Conceptual issues in the literature on regulation and forbearance  
 
From the introductory discussion it will be clear that the topic of forbearance reaches 
in to many aspects of regulation.  This hampers a unified theoretical treatment of the 
subject.  Indeed, to quote Freixas and Rochet (1998), banking regulation involves 
“diverse issues, all of them worth devoting effort to, but so heterogeneous that no 
model can encompass the main issues”.   
 
In all countries, banks operate under a set of standing regulations with regard to 
minimum capitalization.  In addition there are typically limitations on lending to 
related parties and other rules about risk concentrations.  There may be minimum 
liquidity ratios.  Forbearance can mean waivers of any or all of these rules.  Here we 
will focus on capital forbearance.  
 
Confining attention to forbearance on capital adequacy regulation narrows the focus 
somewhat, but not by much.  Despite the growing complexity and sophistication of 
the models employed in this part of the literature, they tend to emphasize some 
aspects more than others, and arguably underplay some dimensions that are important 
in developing country applications.  
 
Thus, existing models emphasize: 
 
(i)  The effect of different degrees of regulatory enforcement on bank risk-
taking 
(ii)  Socially inefficient mid-stream liquidation due to enforcement of 
regulations vis-à-vis a single bank 
(iii)  The danger that the solvency or liquidity difficulties of one bank will 
create significant externalities for others, manifested through various forms 
of contagion 
(iv)  Different ways of structuring regulators’ incentives through assignment of 
powers and responsibilities. 
 
Most models characterize the policy issue simply as whether or not the bank should 
be closed.  In practice a graduated response, involving a range of intermediate actions 
  4or sanctions may be applied by the regulator: the bank can be obliged to take (or 
refrain from taking) specific actions; the frequency and intensity of on-site inspections 
and auditing can be stepped-up; management can be changed and boards of directors 
augmented.  These nuances are missing from most (though not all) of the theoretical 
literature. 
 
2.1  Impact of expected forbearance on bank risk-taking: the ex ante problem 
Knowing that hitting a capital floor will trigger intervention, banks will adapt their 
behaviour.
1  On the other hand, an expectation of regulatory forbearance will tend to 
reduce the behavioural effect of any regulation.  This is the ex ante problem. 
 
If tight capital requirements reduce risk, then easing them through expected 
forbearance will likely increase risk. But, as is well known since the work of Kim and 
Santomero (1988) and Keeley and Furlong (1990), it may be a mistake to assume that 
a capital adequacy requirement will always reduce banking risk. After all, imposing a 
binding minimum capital standard on a bank is likely to alter the structure as well as 
the scale of the bank’s risk portfolio.  Although the volume of risky assets will be 
lower, the bank will have altered the allocation in the direction of having riskier assets 
(and this effect may be so strong as to result in a net increase in the risk of bank 
failure).    
 
Even in this perverse case, where imposition of capital requirements increases risk, it 
is conceivable that expected forbearance could increase it further.  For example, in the 
model of Rochet (1992), bankers maximize a one-period-ahead mean-variance utility 
of wealth function taking into account limited liability and costs of bankruptcy, 
subject to satisfying a first period capital adequacy standard. Adding a cost of 
breaching the minimum capital standard in the second period in this model would 
reduce the risk taken by such a bank; but expected second period forbearance on the 
capital rule would undo that effect.
2
                                                 
1 For an elegant recent modeling of this, see Elizalde and Repullo (2006) 
2 This kind of two-period model continues to be explored with more realistic and flexible specifications 
of banking technology. For example, the banks in Kopecky and VanHoose (2006) can vary the level of 
loan monitoring in order to enhance the rate of return on loans and reduce the risk of violating 
regulatory capital minima.  Introducing a minimum capital standard here will result in lower lending 
but may not increase monitoring, though once the standard is in place, tightening it will increase 
monitoring.   
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Returning to the more conventional world where more capital means less risk, it may 
still not be optimal from the point of view of ex ante risk reduction to exclude all 
forbearance, considering the fact that capital can be a more costly way of funding 
lending.  This is brought out especially by models which take the risk menu faced by 
the bank as being continuous (rather than assuming that bankers choose between just 
two levels of risk or effort).  Following the suggestion by Allen and Saunders (1993) 
that the cost of deposit insurance effectively arises because regulators choose to 
forbear from prompt closure decisions, So and Wei (2004) provide such a model of 
such regulatory behavior, and combine it with the assumption that regulatory 
forbearance is accompanied by intensified frequency of auditing by the regulator.
3  
The impact of the resulting moral hazard on the fair insurance premium is found to be 
much higher than that on the bank’s equity value in simulations reported by So and 
Wei, highlighting the way the bank can shift risk to the deposit insurer under 
forbearance.  Nevertheless, their simulations suggest that a small amount of 
forbearance may be optimal – reflecting the difference between a discrete and 
continuous formulation. 
 
But how easily could a regulator estimate and define the appropriate small amount of 
forbearance in an environment where accounting information is especially deficient, 
as in most developing countries?  The applicability of these theories, all of which 
implicitly assume that banks’ actual capital position and the risk to which they are 
exposed are both calculable with a high degree of accuracy, seems probelmatic.   
 
This is even more evident in many studies focusing on the design of regulatory capital 
rules under Basel II. For example, Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004) discuss the relative 
merits of calibrating regulatory capital according to the Value at Risk VaR (i.e., the 
level of loss that can be avoided over a certain period with a given – say 99 per cent – 
probability) or according to the expected loss conditional on a tail event.  But given 
the current precision of credit appraisal in most developing countries, the idea that 
either of these could be measured with any degree of precision let alone whether one 
could determine the relative precision with which they were being estimated seems 
                                                 
3 Thus exemplifying the potential for graduated response to emerging problems. 
  6fanciful.
4  Instead, as discussed in Section 3 below, capital measurement is a coarse 
science in developing countries. 
 
The dangers of allowing a bank with low or negative capital to operate are clear.  The 
temptation is for shareholders to gamble on risky ventures with negative expected 
returns, given that they have little more to lose (the so-called deposit-put).  But 
excessive risk-taking by undercapitalized bankers may not be the worst that can 
happen, as is illustrated in Akerlof and Romer’s (1993) model of looting. In this very 
simple model, bank management exploits limited liability, combined with the 
gullibility of depositors or the insouciance of the government as deposit insurer.  It’s 
not just a question of the management taking excessive risk in the hope that the value 
of the bank will improve. In Akerlof and Romer’s model, management seeks to 
extract as much value as possible (by legal or perhaps also illegal means) from the 
cash flow of a bank with the full intention of driving the bank into insolvency. As 
Akerlof and Romer note, when a bank moves into the looting phase, the “normal 
economics of maximizing economic value is replaced by the topsy-turvy economics 
of maximizing current extractable value, which tends to drive the firm’s economic net 
worth deeply negative.”
5  Only an undercapitalized bank will opt for a looting 
strategy.  That is why this model is highly relevant for the analysis of forbearance.  
Indeed, it is the deliberate forbearance in the US allowing undercapitalized or 
insolvent intermediaries to function that motivated Akerlof and Romer’s paper.  
Numerous developing country cases, from Mexico to the Philippines, though less 
thoroughly documented, seem illustrative of this behaviour. 
 
                                                 
4 The reputation and credibility of accounts even in advanced economies has taken several severe 
knocks in recent years, making Akerlof and Romer’s (1993) complaints about inclusion of “goodwill” 
in the accounts of US Thrifts, and the transitory income-inflating effect of term transformation (when 
the yield curve is positively sloping) seem quaint these days.  
5 In the real world, it is not always clear ex post whether loans going bad reflects high variance, or 
negative expected yields from the start. Akerlof and Romer suggest that a telltale indication of an bank 
that is being looted is the management’s lack of concern about maintaining adequate documentation on 
loans: if the bank is “going for broke” the management will want those risky loans well-documented in 
order to be able to recover them if the gamble pays off.  But if they are deliberately “going broke” it is 
the liquidator and not the current management that will have to attempt collection, as the current 
management do not expect to be around when the loans come up for collection.  Looters will also seek 
nonbank collaborators to help them construct what will eventually be loss-making loan transactions but 
which spin off large cash flows in the short-run.  The collaborators may be either naïve or 
unscrupulous; their involvement multiplies the social losses above the direct benefit to the looter. This 
deadweight cost of looting is exactly analogous to that demonstrated for corruption by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993). 
  72.2  Inefficient liquidation: the ex post problem 
Even if the forbearance policy has been carefully designed to induce optimal risk-
taking, it can result in decisionmakers finding themselves in a position where they 
wish they could tear up the rule book. Intertemporal models such as the three period 
models, widely used for analysis of liquidity crises, generally have this feature.  For 
instance the model of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) focuses directly on the question 
of a rule for closing the bank in the second period that induces the bank’s managers to 
make adequate effort in the first period.  This rule should not simply take account of 
the best estimate at the second period of the bank’s future profit in the third period; in 
addition, since first period profits of the bank are indicative of the managers’ effort, 
they should also be taken into account in the closure decision.  Drawing on parallels 
with the modern theory of corporate finance, Dewatripont and Tirole show that the 
best ex ante rule can be implemented by giving the regulator (as representative of the 
depositors) control (i.e. the decision on whether or not to close) when first period 
performance falls below a certain floor, while leaving control with the shareholders 
otherwise.  However, the solution is time inconsistent: there will be situations where 
the bank will be closed by the regulator even though its final period promises to be 
profitable.  This model does illustrate one example in which forbearance is ex post 
inefficient but ex ante efficient. Banks are being closed “pour encourager les autres”, 
and not because leaving them open is going to worsen their net position.  
 
The social costs that can be incurred by the process of closing a bank can militate in 
practice against enforcement of capital adequacy requirements, and in effect represent 
a reason for forbearance (as in Sleet and Smith, 2000).  For example, even though a 
bank’s capital has fallen below the regulatory minimum, it may be holding illiquid 
assets which it would be socially inefficient to liquidate on closure.  Likewise, the 
relationship capital that has been accumulated over the years by borrowers with their 
bankers could be lost.
6  
 
More generally, absent complete markets, it is possible for a tough regulatory 
enforcement to seem ex ante optimal, but to prove time inconsistent.  The authorities 
                                                 
6 On the other hand, cynics will point to the merits of breaking corrupt crony relationships between 
bank insiders and some of their preferred borrowers. 




With two- or three-period models, one can make a clear distinction between the ex 
ante and ex post problems.  Things become a bit more blurred if we track the 
evolution of a weakening bank through time.  As a bank nears its capital minimum, 
the risk of being closed soon affects the banker’s incentive to conceal the true 
situation and can increase risk taking.  In such circumstances, a stochastic closure rule 
can be better than a strict no-forbearance rule.   
 
For example, Shim (2006) presents a multi-period model
8 in which the regulator 
cannot fully detect the profits being made by the banker nor the level of risk-reducing 
effort.  The regulator sets deposit insurance premium and minimum capital levels to 
incentivize the banker to make the necessary efforts both to achieve profits and not to 
conceal them, even if the bank is close to closure.  As a result, Shim finds that while 
prompt corrective action is appropriate, it should be applied stochastically: allowing 
bankers to hope they may be recapitalized, in order that may continue to make some 
efforts.
9  Here again some forbearance turns out to be optimal—but then again, how 
realistic is such a prescription for regulators in low-income environments? How easily 
can a regulator who is operating a stochastic forbearance rule be monitored? 
 
This brief discussion of the literature on incentive effects—both ex ante and ex post—
should be enough to show that these are sufficiently complex to have generated a 
prolonged and sophisticated literature which continues to generate conflicting 
theoretical conclusions regarding the optimality of forbearance, even when only one 
                                                 
7 In Mailath and Mester’s (1994) paper, which also uses a three-period set-up, the regulator is not 
looking at capital adequacy, but instead at an indicator of whether the bank has adopted a risky or safe 
strategy in the first period. The decision as to whether to close comes in the second period. In this case 
too the inability of welfare-maximizing authorities to commit to a tough closure policy can result in 
higher risk-taking than would otherwise occur. 
8 The model is a rather abstract one, chosen in order to be able to exploit known results from stochastic 
control theory to derive the optimal program; however Shim shows that the model can be mapped to an 
implementation framework which has some comparability with real world banking regulation. 
9 In a slightly different set-up Kocherlakota and Shim (2007) also explore optimal regulatory policy, 
but in an environment dominated by collateralized lending. Instead of moral hazard, the volatility of 
collateral values is emphasized.  If collateral values are not highly volatile, then they show that an 
optimal closure rule will involve some forbearance: conditions under which a bank that is surely going 
to impose some costs on the deposit insurer (because of the decline in posted collateral values), is 
nevertheless allowed to stay in business given the expected social returns of its future operations.  If 
collateral values are very volatile, then forbearance will not be optimal. 
  9bank is being considered at a time.  Additional complications arise because of the 
interdependence of banking firms. 
 
2.3   Market interactions 
In the real world there is more than one bank and the interaction of different banks 
also has a bearing on the consequences of regulatory closure decisions (cf. Goodhart 
et al., 2003, whose model also captures the linkage with monetary policy). One aspect 
here is the fragility represented by the possibility of a self-fulfilling depositor panic, 
analyzed for a single bank by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and which underlies the 
fear that a disturbance in any part of the system could represent the trigger or 
coordinating event for a wider collapse. Such systemic collapses and their 
vulnerability to extrinsic events are modeled by Allen and Gale (2007, Chapter 5). 
 
Linkages between banks on the lending side can crop up in several different relevant 
ways.  For example, banks may make inferences about future prospects, including 
creditworthiness, that are based in part on looking over their shoulders at what other 
banks are doing (Honohan, 1999).  Such information externalities are analyzed by a 
large and growing literature, (cf. Allen, Morris and Shin, 2006). 
 
A contrasting form of interaction on the lending side arises with multi-bank lending, 
as well as with modern forms of structured asset-backed lending that also entail 
multiple lenders.  These interactions have been modeled by Huang and Xu (2000) 
who integrate analysis of the interbank market with multi-bank project financing and 
the lender of last resort. Huang and Xu argue that having multiple financiers 
strengthens the financial system by imposing a harder budget constraint on borrowers.  
They assume that a consortium of financiers will find it difficult to agree on 
reorganization of a project in difficulty.
 10  This will lead to socially inefficient closure 
of troubled projects, but the fact that a hard budget constraint is known to be in place 
will also improve the incentive for entrepreneurs to choose a better project in the first 
place. The lower average quality of projects, and the impossibility of detecting which 
                                                 
10 The way in which the market for asset-backed securities dried-up in 2007 could be an example of 
this kind of situation. 
  10projects are good and which are bad, results in a pooling equilibrium in the interbank 
market potentially resulting in a collapse of the market due to the lemons problem.
11     
 
Diamond and Rajan (2005) show that a form of contagion leading to systemic 
liquidity shortages may arise even without depositor panics or contractual links 
between banks.  Their model requires banks to issue demandable debt (as a 
disciplining device on the bankers) which they use to finance potentially late-maturing 
projects. Banks can choose between liquidating or refinancing late-maturing projects, 
but this choice is not available to a bank which experiences so many late projects that 
it suffers a rational depositor run. Indeed, given the sequence of information flows, it 
may in this case have to liquidate even the early maturing projects.  The consequence 
for systemic liquidity depends on the distribution of late projects between banks and 
thus on how many are run and have to liquidate their projects at a loss. It is a feature 
of their model that recapitalization (by the authorities) of illiquid failing banks may 
destroy healthier banks and give rise to the need for massive recapitalization as the 
scramble for liquidity intensifies and projects are liquidated early.  Instead, in their 
model, if the crisis cannot be resolved by a pure injection of liquidity into the system, 
recapitalization should be directed to the most liquid of the failing banks.  More 
generally, they argue that intervention or forbearance policy needs to consider the 
general equilibrium, and not just the condition of each bank on its individual merits. 
 
Conversion of a relatively isolated solvency shock into a systemic meltdown through 
collapse of the interbank market is, however, much less likely in an environment such 
as that in many developing countries where the interbank market is very small and 
inactive.  This point is taken up in Section 4 below. 
 
2.4  Regulatory incentives and behavior 
Thus far, the discussion has implicitly assumed that regulators are choosing their 
actions in accordance with social welfare optimization.  This assumption may not be 
valid.  Different agencies are typically assigned more narrowly defined objectives 
                                                 
11 Huang and Xu made the interesting suggestion that, when it comes to offering liquidity assistance to 
illiquid banks in the event of the pooling equilibrium leading to a collapse of the interbank market, the 
regulatory authorities should offer such assistance only at the price of a heavy rate of profits taxation.  
Offering such a contract can separate the solvent and illiquid from the insolvent, since the former will 
be reluctant to seek assistance.  (Bagehot’s penalty rate and equity instead of debt injections would be 
variants of this idea.) 
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Tirole).  Accordingly, another strand of the literature examines the incentives of the 
regulator, when several alternative institutions are present, such as the central bank as 
monetary authority, the deposit insurer as issuer of contingent quasi-fiscal liabilities 
and the prudential regulator may be evaluated and rewarded on the basis of success in 
protecting the interests of depositors.  The questions of interest in this strand include 
the assignment of powers and responsibilities between different agencies, and the 
specification of the agency’s explicit and implicit incentive structures.  Indeed, as 
pointed out by Repullo (2000) and Kahn and Santos (2001), the deposit insurer and 
the central bank will experience a different impact on their profit and loss account in 
the case of closure.  In Repullo’s three-period model, depositor withdrawals in the 
middle period may leave the bank subject to closure.  If it is to survive, the central 
bank has to make a loan, thereby putting its own money at risk.  It stands to lose all of 
its loan if the bank fails (especially if, as is usual) the central bank’s claim is junior to 
that of depositors.  But the central bank’s liability in the failure may be limited to the 
loan it has made. The deposit insurer, on the other hand, could be liable to meet all of 
the depositors’ remaining claims if the bank fails in the final period.  This illustrates 
the different incentives of the two institutions: the central bank may be more willing 
to keep the bank going than the deposit insurer.  So it matters which of these two 
agencies has the responsibility to decide on closure. 
 
Evidently, all of the analysis considered so far may be irrelevant if the regulator can 
be bribed for a small sum, or if the regulator’s political instructions are to forbear on 
the capital adequacy problems of a troubled bank.  These are problems more likely to 
be encountered in developing countries (Section 5). In either case stated regulations 
will impose little cost on a bank whose true capital has dipped below the regulatory 
minimum. 
 
Theories of corruption (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) and incentive structures for 
bureaucracy (cf. Prendergast, 2006) have a clear potential application here. Perhaps 
the most relevant strand of theoretical literature here, though, is exemplified by 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), who argue the case for simple and easily verifiable 
regulations over the subtle and complex.  This is essentially the same case as is made 
for bright lines over lengthy codes in other aspects of regulation. Bright lines mean 
  12lower verification and enforcement costs and greater ease of supervision of the 
regulatory agent by their principal.  If the rules are clear, and verifiable, everyone can 
see when they are being violated: all market participants are called to witness and a 
new channel of market discipline is established. These benefits can be lost in the 
blurred environment of regulatory discretion and forbearance.   
 
The literature on bright line standards in accounting presents similar conclusions in 
more elaborate models.  For instance, Caplan and Kirschenheiter (2001) argue that 
use of “hard” bright line rules enhances the value of basic audits, limited to 
verification of facts, though it may do little to help things if a higher level of “expert” 
auditors are conducting the audits.  It may well be that the sophistication and 
interpretive discretion of the typical bank supervisor could be classified as at “basic” 
rather than “expert”.
12   
 
 
3.  Information deficiencies in developing countries 
  
Casual discussion of forbearance tends to assume that estimating the value of a bank’s 
capital is a technical matter which can be done with a reasonable degree of confidence 
by well-trained regulators. The decision to forbear or not is, in this view, something 
which can be readily detected by all concerned.  This is far from being the case in 
practice, however, especially in developing countries, and this fact must strongly 
influence the decision as to how much discretion to allow regulators in these 
countries. 
 
The best way to illustrate the nature and extent of information problems is to illustrate 
by real world examples. We take five cases to illustrate the kinds of problem that 
arise.   
 
First, there is the case of the Egyptian state-owned banks.  After 2002 it was 
recognized that the four large state-owned banks that dominate Egypt’s banking 
system needed to be restructured and recapitalized, a process which is still under way, 
                                                 
12 As the accounting literature observes, very precise rules can create precise “safe havens” for 
malpractice; and this could present problems for bank accounting too (Nelson, 2003). 
  13with one of them having been privatized in 2006.  Undercapitalization was not 
indicated in the audited accounts of these banks; indeed, average capitalization of the 
banking system was about 10 per cent. The interesting thing, though, is the evidence 
that, from 1994 to 2001, bank management were likely aware at least partially, that 
the accounts they were presenting were optimistic.  Appendix 1 shows the evidence 
for a pattern of profit reporting that strongly suggests a strategy of limiting loan loss 
provisioning to an amount that still left reported profits slightly positive.  This 
example of earnings management – or what is sometimes called “upside-down 
accounting” – carried out over an extended period by some of the largest banks on the 
African continent is a clear indication that apparent compliance with capitalization 
requirements is no guarantee of actual compliance, even when some agents in the 
system know that the accounts are misleading. 
 
A second case is the Chinese banks.  There are similarities here with the case of Egypt 
in that it concerns State-owned banks.  Action by the authorities to recapitalize these 
banks has been ongoing since 1998.  A complicated series of transactions had resulted 
by 2006 in net fiscal costs in excess of USD 300 billion equivalent—the largest 
banking bail-out in history (Honohan, 2007; Podpiera, 2005).  This amount, which is 
unlikely to be the full account even for the four main state-owned commercial banks, 
does not include fiscal costs relating to other parts of the banking and nearbanking 
system, which could bring the grand total close to USD 500 billion – or about 50 per 
cent of reported 2001 GDP.  Most of these transactions have been in the form of asset 
purchases by other state agencies at prices that have proved to be well above 
recoverable values: the subsidy embedded in these transactions has not been officially 
acknowledged.  To what extent the ultimate cost was known, and to what extent the 
need for an injection of funds on this scale only dawned gradually on regulators is 
hard to assess.  Lardy (1998) set out a plausible account of how the banks had been 
deliberately used as an alternative to the use of artificial prices and direct transfers to 
support some state-owned enterprises in the process of China’s transition to a market 
economy.  He foresaw significant deferred fiscal costs in this practice.  A wide range 
of analysts’ forecasts for total losses was presented during the years 1998 to 2006; 
these generally presented a wide range or merely confined themselves to general 
statements such as that in the Fitch report of May 2002, to the effect that “in practice, 
the banking system is substantially insolvent”. 
  14 
With such a wide range of estimates (even if some of the relevant regulatory 
authorities may have had more precise information – though with incoherent 
governance structures at the banks in this period that assumption cannot be made) it is 
easy both to argue that this has been a large and protracted case of capital adequacy 
forbearance and at the same time to wonder whether the authorities really could have 
defined within any acceptable margin of error what recapitalization would be required 
to bring the banks up to regulatory standards.   
 
Instead of attempting a fully realistic calculation of the banks’ capital and insisting 
that it should be brought up to regulatory minima, the authorities embarked on a 
multi-stranded decade-long effort to put the banks’ finances to rights.  The negative 
capital position was never explicitly acknowledged, but it was corrected through a 
variety of restructuring mechanisms, mainly loan sales to newly created asset 
management companies (shifting the measurement issues to these nonbanks, while 
improving the precision of the estimate of capital of the banks).  At the same time, the 
authorities also placed pressure on bank managements not through capital targets but 
instead by setting and enforcing (from 1998) a target for the proportion of the loan 
portfolio that was non-performing.  Each of the four state-owned banks was required 
to lower this proportion by 2-3 percentage points per year.  Top management of the 
banks were made accountable for achieving this target which was given a high profile.  
Indeed, judging from the annual reports of the banks, it appears to have been met.  But 
NPL ratios, while readily measured, can be improved without achieving a substantive 
improvement in solvency prospects.  Writing-off an NPL, or rescheduling the loan, 
are just two ways of lowering this ratio without improving the capitalization of the 
bank.  That, despite these shortcomings, the Chinese authorities should have focused 
on NPLs rather than capital points to their recognition of the severe measurement 
difficulties with capital adequacy itself.   
 
(It may reasonably be asked whether a state-owned bank needs to be held to a high 
level of capital.  Without private shareholders, the adverse incentive effects of low 
capitalization are not so clear, and the role of capital as a buffer is also moot: the 
capital is owned by the state, so its loss entails the same fiscal cost as would be 
involved in compensating losses incurred by a zero-capital bank.  Curiously, this point 
  15is not widely accepted in the policy literature.  In the Chinese case, it has been 
superseded by the decision to part-privatize the banks). 
 
The case of Lebanon is more complex still.  The Lebanese banks have sizable claims  
on the Government of Lebanon, which indeed is more heavily indebted to the banking 
system (relative to GDP) than any other government in the world.  Lebanese banks 
also attract an extraordinarily high volume of deposits in relation to GDP, and over 
two-thirds of these are denominated in US dollars reflecting the high dollarization of 
the Lebanese economy generally as well as the sizable openness of that economy.  
The fiscal situation in the Lebanon has seemed unsustainable to many observers at 
different points over the past decade or more, as has the currency peg, which has been 
held for a decade.  The banks’ claims on the government include some in local 
currency and some denominated in USD.  The Lebanese banks cannot survive a 
collapse of the currency and/or the market value of government debt.  How should 
these sizable risks be factored into the accounting for Lebanon’s banks?  At present, 
no special provisions are being made, and the accounts can be seen as fair and 
accurate conditional on survival of the currency and fiscal situation, but perhaps not 
otherwise.  In practice, however, on two occasions in the past 5 years, just when 
default seemed increasingly unavoidable, a special donor conference has coughed up 
sizable transfers and loans to Lebanon allowing the evil day to be postponed.  It is not 
inconceivable that this pattern could be repeated indefinitely.  So what is the true 
value of the Lebanese banks’ portfolio and are they to be considered truly adequately 
capitalized?  The difficulty of answering this question highlights the questionable 
precision of bank accounts in developing countries generally, even if the measurement 
problems are not so acute or indeed endogenous to the health of the banking system. 
 
We will pass over the numerous cases of other banking systems which were 
overwhelmed by macroeconomic downturns and where ex post the degree to which 
the final deteriorated condition of the banks owes more to the economic downturn and 
how much to flawed underwriting (or ‘crony capitalism’).  These too point to the 
difficulty of providing a reasonable range for the ex ante underlying value of each 
bank’s capital. 
 
  16There have also been several large individual bank failures in developing countries, 
often associated with fraud, which were so large as to have systemic ramifications.  
Perhaps the cleanest example of this, and a case where forbearance over a period of 
several months during which large liquidity loans from the central bank were looted 
by bank insiders, was that of Banco Latino in Venezuela 1994-95.  The regulator was 
not equipped with adequate legislative support at the time of this crisis (thanks to 
parliamentary opposition likely fomented or at least abetted by looting bank owners).  
However, it appears that the regulator did not consider Banco Latino to be insolvent, 
yet allowed liquidity loans amounting to USD 9 billion (or about 15 per cent of 
Venezuela’s GDP) to be lost due to inadequate information about the bank’s balance 
sheet.
13    
 
Similar in magnitude, the failure of Banco Intercontinental (Baninter), the third largest 
bank in the Dominican Republic in May 2003 also revealed a huge accounting fraud.  
Here was a case of the diverted deposits fraud (Caprio and Honohan, 2005) where the 
regulator is shown a set of accounts which omits a segment
14 of the deposits which 
have been placed with the bank, and which are being looted by insiders.  Given the 
scale of the discrepancy in the case of Baninter (reportedly USD 2.2 billion equivalent 
to about a third of the end-2002 deposits in the banking system, or about 11 per cent 
of GDP; liquidity loans to Baninter and two other weak banks hit by contagious 
depositor withdrawals totaled more than twice that sum) it is hard to understand how 
the regulator could not have suspected that something was amiss.
15,16
 
Some have held out the hope that private rating agencies would have the necessary 
incentive and market information to do as well or better than the official regulator in 
sniffing out problematic sets of accounts, with a focus on default risks.  An increasing 
number of banks in developing countries are being rated by the international rating 
                                                 
13 More than one bank was involved in this rather complex story.  In essence, it appears to have been a 
version of the diverted deposits fraud discussed later. 
14 As much as 90 per cent in the case of Imar Bank in Turkey in 2003 (Soral et al., 2006) 
15 An IMF-World Bank FSAP assessment was carried out shortly before the collapse but did not 
pinpoint the failing bank or foresee the crisis. 
16 Brownbridge (2002) describes the failure of Greenland Bank, Uganda.  At June 1998, the managers 
were reporting the bank as solvent, but a special audit conducted by a big-5 international accounting 
firm found a net capital deficiency of USh 0.3 billion, or about 0.3% of the bank’s total assets.  
However, the audit and investigation conducted after its closure just nine months later in April 1999 
found unreported deposits and assets and estimated a negative net worth of over UGX 62 billion, or 
about 60 per cent of total assets. 
  17firms (Caprio and Honohan, 2004).  However, they too have failed to anticipate large 
bank collapses, even those that were unrelated to macroeconomic downturns.  For 
example, the failure in mid 1995 of Banco Nacional and Banco Economico in Brazil, 
with deficiencies totaling almost USD 10 billion, were not foreseen by international 
analysts.
17  And a December 2002 Fitch report on the Dominican Banking System 
noted robust profitability and struck no note of caution, this just five months before 
the devastating banking collapse in that country already mentioned above. 
 
The examples provided show that precise information is often not available to 
regulators—or other market participants—in developing countries.  But this is not 
because of structural complexity in these markets; indeed, developing country 
banking systems display much less interconnectedness than do those of advanced 
economies. 
 
4:  Interconnectedness, contagion  and liquidity 
 
Interconnectedness is less in developing country financial systems.  This arguable 
proposition, with its implication that a disturbance to one intermediary is less likely to 
be transmitted to others, is based on three distinct observations. First, interbank 
markets are typically small in relation to the size of the banking system and relatively 
inactive.  Second, the financial systems are small relative to the economy.  Third, 
large depositors and many of the larger firms have access to international financial 
markets.  These considerations do not rule out the emergence of a contagious event 
spreading illiquidity through the system at large, but they reduce its likelihood. 
 
Interbank markets tend to be smaller and less active partly because of the limited 
diversity of  banking activities, partly because of the limited use of derivatives and the 
                                                 
17 Neither of these Brazilian failures could easily have been foreseen from the published data.  In 
particular, excessive asset growth was hardly evident: thus, although Nacional’s market share (among the 
five largest private banks) had increased from 14 to 26 per cent between 1990 and 1993, it had since 
fallen back; Economico’s market share had slipped in the five years before its failure.  Furthermore, both 
banks were reporting a slightly lower share of non-performing loans than their peers.  Admittedly, 
Nacional’s reported risk-weighted capital adequacy was, at about 9 per cent, well below that of the other 
large private banks, its shares were trading on a low price-earnings ratio, and other banks were no longer 
lending to it on the interbank market.  But as late as November 1994 international analysts Salomon 
Brothers described it as a “strong” bank which they believed would be a “long-term winner”; and in June 
1995, less than five months before the deposit run that precipitated the bank’s failure, they recommended 
the shares as a “hold”.  
  18smaller volume of payments transactions related to securities trading, and partly 
because of the lower credit ratings of many banks in these countries.  Indeed, the 
pattern in many countries is for the bulk of the interbank borrowing to be made by the 
local branches or subsidiaries of international banks who may have a smaller retail 
franchise and less direct access to local currency deposits.
18   
 
When interbank markets are small and the net takers are (in the event that they are 
unable to rollover their interbank borrowings) in a position to finance themselves 
from parent companies abroad, the likelihood of many types of events studied in the 
literature on liquidity crises is greatly reduced.   
 
The small size of many financial systems also reflects the degree to which the 
economy is not inextricably permeated with contracts that depend on continuous 
smooth functioning of the financial system.  Of course the widespread collapses of 
retail markets in Argentina in the crisis of 2001-2 does show how basic economic 
functioning does require the banking system on a continuous basis. On the other hand, 
the survival of the BRI village microfinance system through the 1998 banking crisis 
of that country displays the degree to which even some financial intermediation can 
survive the widespread failure of banks.  The rapid recovery (helped by energy prices) 
of the Russian economy also points in the same direction. And the credit-less 
“phoenix” recoveries documented by Calvo et al., (2007) also show that the 
contribution of financial depth to growth is not simply to be measured by short-term 
fluctuations in credit in such economies. 
 
Finally, all developing country systems are small relative to global finance and in 
many countries there are appreciable links between the larger economic agents and 
the rest of the world.  On the deposit side these are graphically illustrated by Figure 1 
which shows the ratio of offshore bank deposits held by residents to domestic bank 
deposits.   Although the phenomenon is strongest in Africa and Latin America, this 
reserve pool of liquidity (as well as international credit lines that are available to the 
                                                 
18 This is especially noticeable in the many countries where foreign currency deposits have begun to 
take a sizable fraction of the deposit market.  Often it is the foreign banks that get a disproportionate 
share of the foreign currency deposits but are short of local currency to lend to their corporate clients. 
  19larger firms) is appreciable and also makes the likelihood of the kinds of liquidity 
crunch described in several models smaller. 
 
This is not to say that liquidity crises are impossible.  Far from it.  But many of the 
liquidity crises that have been seen are closely related to fears of exchange rate 
collapse or of default by national authorities—not to self-generated failures arising in 
the banking system.   
 
The main type of bank-related liquidity crisis that these remarks do not speak to is 
depositor panic associated with a contagious reassessment of the solvency and 
liquidity of banks in general following revelation (whether from regulatory action or 
otherwise) of solvency problems somewhere in the system.  There have undoubtedly 
been a number of such events in recent years.   
 
The depositor response to the closure of banks in Indonesia is one such case.
19  The 
closure of 16 banks, accounting for about 3 per cent of the system, in Indonesia in 
October 1997 is often cited as an example of how lack of forbearance can trigger a 
panic.  In fact a closer look at the situation supports quite the opposite view.  It is 
acknowledged that the closure event heightened depositor uncertainty and contributed 
to considerable withdrawals over the following months.  But these depositor 
withdrawals were not irrational responses that caused other banks to fail.  Instead, 
they were at least in part a response to the partial nature of the policy intervention, 
which left open most of the weak banks—almost all of them much larger than the 
closed 16—without indicating whether and on what basis there would be further 
closures.  No wonder that depositors felt sure that the closures were only the start 
(audits made in mid 1998 confirmed that insolvency in the banking system was 
already entrenched by late 1997, cf. Enoch et al., 2001).  The scale of deposit 
withdrawals fed, and was exacerbated by, a collapse of the exchange rate, worsening 
the bank insolvency.  The authorities decided in January 1998 to guarantee the full 
amount of bank deposits.  By March of the following year a total of 79 of the 222 
                                                 
19 Kenyan depositors also ran from a class of banks that began to have difficulties in the late 1990s—
though in this case too it seems that there were widespread problems in the class of banks affected by 
the runs. 
  20banks in Indonesia (accounting for over 40 per cent of the total assets of the system) 
had been closed, merged or nationalized. (Fane and McLeod, 2002). 
 
So while the handling of the banking weaknesses by means of the initial closure was 
highly destabilizing, and while the subsequent collapse of the exchange rate 
undoubtedly aggravated the insolvency of the remaining banks (Radelet and Sachs, 
1998), it seems likely that a more comprehensive intervention into weak banks (thus 
less forbearance), accompanied by a clear statement of future closure policy, and 
combined with a coherent macroeconomic strategy would have been better. 
 
It might seem perverse to question the importance or frequency of contagion within 
developing country banking systems when so many systemic events have occurred.  
The point is, though, that what appears to be contagion is so often a common cause 
(e.g. a macro boom and bust cycle) or a simultaneous uncovering of a widespread 
deficiency (Honohan, 2000).  Quite often, the denouement occurs after a change of 
government exposes a pattern of politically motivated forbearance, and this points to 
the pervasive agency problems that are so prominent in banking regulation in much of 
the developing world. 
 
5:  The double agency problem and the goals of regulators 
 
The considerable recent investment in most developing countries in upgrading 
regulatory capacity cannot be assumed to have overcome the considerable agency 
problems that still exist.  It is true that there has been a fairly direct institutional and 
policy transplantation of advanced country practice in the developing world over the 
past two decades.  A process of regulatory convergence has occurred, at least on 
paper, assisted in the past decade by the Basel Core Principles and the formalized 
assessments of national compliance with these Principles carried out mostly under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
  
Yet even if the forms and even the legal powers are converging, account has to be 
taken of the differing nature and intensity of incentive and agency problems that 
surround the implementation of these regulatory structures.  Even in advanced 
economies enjoying a sophisticated electorate and a free press, as well as relatively 
  21efficient and impartial law enforcement, it is evident that regulators are subject to 
pressures and incentives that make it unrealistic to suppose that they are single-
mindedly pursuing the public good. 
 
Combining data on reported corruption in banking across countries, with the Barth et 
al. (2006) data on the structure and style of banking regulation, Beck et al. (2005) 
made the remarkable discovery that banking corruption was significantly correlated 
with the degree of regulatory discretion.  The conclusion drawn by these authors is not 
only that granting bank regulators discretion creates rents which will be manifested in 
corrupt transactions between regulator and bank, but also that somehow a culture of 
corruption will effectively permeate the entire banking system leading to the need for 
borrowers to bribe bank officials and so on.   
 
Of course it is realistic to think of the regulator as an agent of a higher level of 
government.  To an extent, those who work as regulators may be self-selected by a 
desire to ensure safe and sound banking, or can become indoctrinated in a favorable 
regulatory culture.  However, this does not mean that that the regulator will always 
pursue the public interest effectively. For one thing, uncovering errors, misjudgments 
and fraud in banking is not a simple task and requires skill, experience and assiduity.  
These qualities may not be sufficiently present in the regulatory authority.   
 
But in addition, there are reasons why, even if problems are detected, enforcement is 
weak.  This can be because delinquent insiders at regulated banks are prepared to 
bribe the regulator or because the regulator fears the consequences of enforcement 
action either at a personal or an institutional level.  Despite efforts in most countries to 
protect individual regulators from being sued for carrying out their work in good faith, 
it seems to be astonishingly difficult to provide watertight protection in this regard.  A 
decision to enforce regulatory action can mean years under the shadow of court 
proceedings for an individual regulator.  In only 20 of 149 countries surveyed by 
Barth et al. are banks unable to appeal to courts against a decision of the supervisor.
20   
 
                                                 
20 Even in the UK, where regulators enjoy a high degree of protection, regulatory action or inaction can 
result in lengthy litigation.  The unsuccessful case taken by the liquidators of the BCCI against the 
Bank of England concluded only in 2005, almost 15 years after the failure of BCCI.  Retired regulators 
in their 70s had to appear in court to defend their actions – or in this case inaction. 
  22Besides, the delinquent bankers may themselves have political protection, being part 
of an integrated elite which embraces political, financial and industrial dimensions (as 
discussed in the wider context of financial globalization by Stulz, 2005). 
 
Regulators who covertly forbear may never be found out. Although in some instances 
forbearance is explicitly acknowledged and documented,
21 it is often extraordinarily 
difficult to detect deliberate under-enforcement.
22  Under-enforcement will often not 
show up immediately in bank failure, as banks can often survive for years in 
insolvency.  There rarely is an audit trail establishing who knew what when.  And 
when the bank failure is eventually detected, the original under-enforcer is unlikely to 
be still in charge of the desk.  For one thing, the failure often emerges only after a 
change of political regime, when the relevant bankers have lost their political 
protection (and the chief regulator may have lost their job also). Besides, the failure 
will often become evident only during a more general economic downturn, and may 
often be blamed on that downturn, rather than on management failings of several 
years before. 
 
Several agencies are typically involved in bank closure decisions.  Although the 
banking supervisor may seem to be in the frontline of the decision, the big decisions 
are often taken elsewhere.  Among the reasons for this are the fact that the banking 
regulator usually does not have the financial resources to meet liquidity needs of an 
illiquid bank
23 and that (despite the recommendation of the Basel Core Principles) the 
banking regulator’s closure decisions are often subject to a political override.
24
 
In fact, the key role of last resort lending by the central bank in several recent 
failures—most spectacularly in the Venezuelan and Dominican cases mentioned 
                                                 
21 As in the Turkish case discussed by Soral et al. (2006)—though even then, the bank concerned 
appears to have been concealing much fraud from the supervisor. 
22The length of the unsuccessful attempts to prove “misfeasance” (a variant of negligence) by UK 
regulators in the case of the  BCCI illustrate the problem even in an advanced economy context.  In 
contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) suggest that a good accounting system can often detect other 
forms of corruption such as, for example, the granting of licenses for a bribe to the responsible official 
instead of the license fee. 
23 The insolvency of the FSLIC has been mentioned as one of the reasons for excessive forbearance in 
the US S&L Crisis (cf. Black cited in Akerlof and Romer, 1993, p.68) 
24 India, Italy, New Zealand and francophone countries in Africa are among those where the law 
explicitly states that decision on closure is taken by a Government Ministry and not by an independent 
specific financial regulator (cf. World Bank Regulatory Survey).  
  23above—highlights the fact that it is this agency which by default makes the decisions 
re closure by extending (or less often by not extending) liquidity loans to a troubled 
bank while the regulatory agency and deposit insurer stand by. 
 
6  Interaction of information and agency problems 
 
Do the heightened information and incentive problems in developing countries argue 
for or against forbearance?  For example, if the regulator does not know how much 
capital the bank has, is this not an a priori reason for being flexible in terms of 
enforcing any given capital adequacy requirement?  But being flexible means 
tolerating lower capital adequacy and in effect applying a lower capital adequacy 
standard.  A simple model shows that, when the regulator also faces the 
countervailing cost of enforcing the regulations, the net effect of higher uncertainty 
will be more failures, unless the regulators’ discretion to be flexible is constrained 
(Appendix 2).  Heuristically the argument runs as follows. 
 
Heightened uncertainty and information deficiencies increase the risk of bank failure 
for any given level of enforced capital adequacy.  `The less precise the regulator’s 
estimate of the bank’s capital, the higher the probability that the bank is being allowed 
to operate with less capital than envisaged.  Lower actual capital increases the risk of 
failure because the cushion of capital against unexpected loan and other losses is 
smaller, and probably also because risk-taking at lower capital levels may be higher 
by the usual limited liability argument.
25
 
Given the pressure (from the banks) on regulators to forbear, i.e. not to require a 
capital injection into a bank thought to be undercapitalized, it is likely that increased 
uncertainty will in practice result in even more forbearance.  The regulator’s decision 
on forbearance will be based on balancing these pressures to forbear against the risks 
of a failure which may be blamed on the regulator.  A relaxation of standards will 
increase the risk of failure but will also respond to the pressure from bank insiders.  If 
what matters to the regulator were just the risk of bank failure, then the regulator may 
be induced by higher uncertainty to increase the enforced level of capital adequacy.  
                                                 
25 Indeed, as uncertainty increases, the risk of failure increases more rapidly with falling levels of 
enforced capital adequacy. 
  24However, this stiffening effect is reduced and may be reversed if the public is unable 
to detect forbearance. 
 
The public’s limited ability to detect forbearance provides the argument for the 
adoption of some regime that will mechanically inhibit forbearance. A bright line 
regulatory regime constrains the regulator’s ability to conceal forbearance motivated 
by political pressures.  According to the line of argument developed, this will result in 
decisions that are closer to the public interest. 
 
If there are good policy reasons for forbearance in a particular instance, these can still 
be put forward in justification of such action 
 
Summary of the argument of the model 
In Appendix 2, then, we sketch a simple model of regulatory discretion, where 
regulators seek to minimize the sum of enforcement costs (the pressures placed upon 
them by the regulated intermediaries trying to avoid the imposition of additional 
capital requirements) and the expected costs resulting from their exposure to criticism 
for apparent forbearance in the case of failure. 
 
The key element being modeled is the difference in information: the bank knows its 
capital position, the regulator has an imprecise estimate of it and the public have an 
even less precise estimate.  The regulator is nominally charged with ensuring that the 
bank only operates when its capital-to-assets ratio is above a statutory threshold.  The 
regulator is only an agent of this policy: it knows it will be criticized if bank failure 
emerges, but it also is under pressure from the bank insiders who don’t want the cost 
of recapitalization—and the more they have to recapitalize, the less they like it. 
 
The interesting question is how the regulator will balance these pressures, and how 
the balance will change as the precision of information in the economy deteriorates.  
Furthermore, will the outcome differ if the regime is one of bright-line enforcement, 
(interpreted here as enforcing capital in accordance with the general public’s 
  25information concerning capital rather than the regulator’s better information which is 
opaque to the general public).
26
 
We focus on the decisions of the regulator.   
−  On the one hand, the regulator does not want to the public to observe an 
incident of bank failure (as this will be associated with social costs and, to the 
extent that the regulator is blamed for forbearance, private costs to the 
regulator).  These we call the regulator’s exposure cost.   
−  On the other hand, enforcement that involves recapitalization will trigger 
private costs to the regulator as bank insiders use political and other powers to 
influence the decision. These we will call the regulator’s enforcement cost 
(illustrated in Figure A2.1).  
 
The probability of failure actually occurring (i.e. a negative capital being observed by 
the general public) will depend not only on required capital (g)
27 but on the precision 
of the available information.  Conditional on the enforced level of capital a fall in the 
precision of either the regulator’s or the public’s information increases the probability 
of failure (Figure A2.3).   
 
Even if failure is observed, the regulator may not be blamed, unless the public come 
to believe that forbearance has been exercised.  The inferred probability that 
forbearance was exercised (conditional on failure) increases with the level of 
information precision (Figure A2.4.)  
 
The product of the two probabilities (of failure and of being blamed for the failure) is 
the regulator’s exposure cost.
 
Putting together the enforcement and exposure costs, as in Figure A2.5a, shows the 
two-edged sword of information deficiencies.  Even if the regulator does impose the 
                                                 
26 With a conventional enforcement regime, he fact that the public do not see the regulator’s signal 
means that the regulator can forbear without the public being fully aware of this.  Given that political or 
other pressures from the bank insiders mean that requiring recapitalizations represents a costly policy 
for the regulator, the fact that forbearance can be concealed may influence the action of the regulator.  
However, with bright line enforcement, forbearance is visible to all. 
27 Through two effects: a shift along the distribution of profit shocks and a change in the variance 
(Figure A2.2) 
  26statutory capital requirement, lack of information by the public means that the 
regulator is still exposed to the risk that they may be blamed for a failure.  On the 
other hand, it is also true that if, faced with severe pressures from the bank 
shareholders, the regulator avoids imposing the full statutory capital ratio, the chances 
of this forbearance being suspected by the public may be low even in the event of 
failure.  So with low public information and severe pressures from bank 
shareholders, regulators will tend to impose too little capital.  Better information by 
the public (or – almost equivalently – bright line enforcement) will, in these 
circumstances, tend to increase the actual capital levels enforced. 
 
To see this, start with the case where public information is weak, so that the exposure 
costs are low and do not decline much as enforced capital g increases.  If enforcement 
costs x are low both as to level and dependence on g, the regulator may even impose a 
higher than statutory capital requirement for fear that he will be wrongly blamed for 
forbearance (Figure A2.5b).  But with the same public information, a high 
enforcement cost will tend to lower the enforced level of capital (Figure A2.5c).   
 
With better public information, the exposure cost curve is steeper, and this will have 
the effect of pushing the enforced capital level g up, even if enforcement costs are 
high. 
 
The model thus strongly suggests that information deficiencies in developing 
countries represent an argument for less, rather than more, regulatory discretion.  Far 
from encouraging flexibility in response to information deficiencies, advisors should 
warn that such countries cannot afford to adopt the luxury of discretion. 
 
7  Seeking empirical evidence 
 
This Section reviews existing cross-country empirical evidence on the impact of 
forbearance on banking crisis costs, and discusses the difficulties that exist in 
extending it to answer the question posed by the present paper.  There is little 
convincing empirical evidence, one way or the other, on the effectiveness or risks of a 
policy of forbearance.  It is hard even to obtain an empirical counterpart to the 
concept of forbearance itself.  And as mentioned there can be degrees of forbearance. 
  27 
The US case is a leading one. The prolonged period of forbearance during the US 
Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s was held by many scholars to have contributed 
greatly to the scale and cost of this crisis.  A consequence of the ensuing debate in the 
US was the enactment in 1991 of FDICIA, which inter alia mandates on regulators 
prompt corrective action where the banks and nearbanks under their remit become 
undercapitalized.
28 Even if they do not amount to ‘zero tolerance’, the limitations on 
regulatory discretion under FDICIA appear to have reduced the amount of 
forbearance.  The sharp drop in the number of institutions which have had to be 
intervened since FDICIA were taken by enthusiasts as an indicator of the 
effectiveness of prompt corrective action under the new Act. Thus, the percentage of 
undercapitalized banks in the US fell from 5 per cent in 1990 and 3 per cent in 1991 
to about 0.2 per cent by 1996 (Benston and Kaufman, 1997).  And there is evidence 
that supervisors have acted more quickly and more effectively to bring faltering banks 
back to health since the enactment of FDICIA (Kane et al. 2007).  Confirming that the 
restrictions on forbearance in the Act are causal in this regard is less easy.  (And not 
all of the evidence favours the interpretation that FDICIA has tightened forbearance 
as much as intended.  For example, Hanweck and Spellman point to evidence from 
the market for subordinated debt, that market participants anticipate longer periods of 
forbearance than the maximum of 270 days envisaged in FDICIA.) But above all, it 
would be unwise to extrapolate experience from the US to the case of the developing 
countries for the reasons explored in Sections 3-5. 
 
Cross-country experience with financial crises can be used to throw some empirical 
light relevant to developing countries.  Looking at the fiscal costs associated with 
some 40 crises for which data were available, Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) found 
that capital forbearance (and other accommodating policies) tended to be statistically 
associated with higher fiscal costs (as a percentage of GDP).  Although the sample 
covered a very wide range of income levels, their study did not attempt to assess 
whether these effects were more or less evident for low income countries.  Table 1 
show the results from extending the analysis in this way.  Per capita GDP (measured 
at purchasing power parities) is interacted with each of the regulatory policies and 
                                                 
28 With this measured at market value wherever possible.  The market valuation approach introduces a 
degree of procyclicality as indicated below if asset liquidations in the crisis depress market prices. 
  28added to a representative core regression in HK (2003).  The interaction terms are not 
together statistically significant (regression B), and an OLS regression strategy 
approach ends with either regression C or D, which suggests that the impact of capital 
forbearance on fiscal costs is not income-sensitive, though use of loan guarantee 
schemes may be a relatively less costly crisis-response policy in higher income 
countries.  Because of the possible endogeneity, two-stage least squares estimates are 
also reported.  These suggest that even the interaction term with loan guarantees is 
actually insignificant.  This dataset thus provides little basis for asserting that income 
levels matter for optimal policy. 
 
It is worth stressing a methodological shortcoming of the Honohan-Klingebiel 
approach, already hinted at in their paper, namely the selection bias entailed in 
running regressions that only include crisis events.  What of the instances when 
forbearance may have prevented a crisis?  Such episodes are not included in the 
sample. In effect, what is being estimated is the loss conditional on there being a 
crisis.  Whether adopting an accommodating policy might also reduce the probability 
of having a crisis is not so clearly addressed by this data set or this study. To be sure, 
the authors did include some macroeconomic determinants of the crisis (θ=1), but still 
there is a sample selection issue given that the variable of interest is E[y], where 
 
] 1 [ ] 1 Pr[ ] [ = = = θ θ y E y E . 
 
Lacking a strong selection equation for the determinants of θ=1 (Honohan, 2000), and 
equally importantly, lacking data on policies adopted in non-crisis situations, we have 
to remain somewhat agnostic about the overall impact of policy on E[y]. 
 
To an extent, the degree of forbearance is something that is detected only in practice.  
Untested regulatory policy is likely to be more rigid in theory than its implementation 
will be in practice. Nevertheless stated regulatory policy may be somewhat 
informative.   
 
Seeking to explain differences across countries in bank ratings, seen as an indicator of 
systemic banking risk, Demirgűç-Kunt, Detragiache and Tressel (2006) used 
  29unpublished assessments of national compliance with various elements of the Basel 
Core Principles for Banking Supervision.  They found that the only parts of the Core 
Principles that were significantly correlated with bank ratings were the chapter 
referring to availability and publication of financial information,
29 and that referring 
to licensing powers.  In particular, that part of the Core Principles most likely to 
indicate forbearance, namely a country’s score on the chapter relating to enforcement 
powers of regulators does not help to predict its banks’ average ratings.   
 
Power of regulators can refer not only to their capacity to enforce regulations, but to 
their discretion in doing so.  Barth et al. (2006) assembled data on regulatory style and 
procedures and argued that increasing supervisory “power” was often 
counterproductive, in contrast to regulatory measures that increase the information 
and incentives for private sector monitoring.  If power and forbearance were 
opposites, then this might suggest that forbearance was a good thing.  But the 
composition of the “power” variable is not simple and needs to be carefully 
considered in this context.  It is formed from the answers to no fewer than 14 
questions, ranging from whether auditors are required to report off-balance sheet 
exposures to the supervisor to whether the supervisor can suspend the director’s 
decision to distribute management fees.  It does not include either of the questions on 
whether supervisors have discretion to forebear.  Interestingly, the degree of 
supervisory discretion
30 is negatively, albeit not strongly, correlated with supervisory 
“power” (R= –0.21).   
 
In order to assess the impact of regulation on the incidence of banking crises, Barth et 
al. regressed an indicator function of a systemic crisis 1988-98 on their indices of 
regulatory practice (as of 1999-2001).  The “power” variable is not significant.  The 
forbearance variables are not included in the reported regressions.
31   
 
                                                 
29 Perhaps it is not surprising that information transparency is particularly favored by rating agencies. 
30 They also have an index of prompt corrective action which has a reassuringly strong negative 
correlation (-0.73) with the forbearance index. 
31 As they acknowledge, it is not clear how to interpret a regression purporting to explain crisis 
incidence in the 1990s by regulatory practice at the end of that decade.  Nevertheless, as a robustness 
check to the earlier work, we may add the Barth et al. indices of regulatory practice to the Honohan-
Klingebiel set of explanatory variables.  As can be seen from Table 2, the selected Barth et al. indices 
are not significant, and they do not change the sign of the HK explanatory variables. 
  30Most of the empirical evidence does not, therefore speak very clearly on the issue at 
hand.  What evidence there is seems to argue against the exercise of supervisory 
discretion, but it is hardly decisive.  
 
8.  Concluding remarks  
 
The degree of discretion to be allowed in regulatory design, and when that discretion 
should be exercised, will remain one of the most contentious issues in bank 
regulation.  Theoretical models cannot decide the issue.  And the prospect of a 
decisive econometric contribution that would decide the matter seems remote.  But 
even if advanced countries can surely benefit from the judicious application of some 
forbearance, developing countries face severe difficulties of agency and of 
information which argue for less regulatory discretion.  
 
If regulators cannot be relied upon to pursue to public interest effectively, it may be 
better to limit their forbearance discretion, allowing the bright line of the basic rules to 
be more easily and visibly enforced.   
 
The dramatically worse information and accounting environment does mean that any 
mechanical rule is unlikely to be fed with good information, but it also reduces the 
regulators’ exposure to criticism inasmuch as forbearance can more easily be 
concealed.  Thus the information deficiencies also argue for less forbearance 
discretion. 
 
Finally, the more limited interdependence of financial sector intermediaries in 
developing countries suggests that the risks of unwittingly triggering a chain reaction 
through a fragile system are less. 
 
To be sure, an absolutist zero tolerance approach would hardly be defensible.  Instead, 
measures to strengthen accountability and transparency of regulatory action (perhaps 
with an appropriate time-lag) should be adopted, together with a tightening of capital 
requirements to take account of the accounting uncertainties.   
 
  31Enforcement need not be mechanical, but there should be a stronger presumption of 
enforcement in developing countries, especially where agency and governance 
problems are thought to be severe.
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 Table 1:  Adding income to the crisis cost regressions 
  Equation: HK2.2   B C D HK3.2 E F
Variable                       
                             
Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat
REALINT 0.430 2.8 0.376 2.4 0.401 2.7 0.383 2.8 0.461 2.8 0.454 2.7 0.356 2.7
LIQSUP  0.996                           
                             
                             
               
             
             
               
                             
                         
                             
3.3 1.566 3.0 1.324 3.1 0.960 3.2 1.005 2.6 0.984 2.4 0.924 2.4
FORB-A 0.826 2.3 0..483 1.2 0.654 2.6 0.684 2.8 0.882 2.9 0.865 2.9 0.653 2.7
FORB-B
 








0.926 2.0 0.948 2.0 1.200
 
2.7
  GUAR 0.746
 
2.4 -0.352 0.7 0.923 3.0 0.848 2.0
LIQSUP*GDPPCPPP -0.060  1.7  -0.038
 
  1.3
FORB-A*GDPPCPPP 0.007  0.3





3.3 0.058 3.4 0.006 0.2 0.042 2.1
Constant 3.426 9.6 3.195 12.4 15.1 3.277 15.9 3.539 10.2 3.516 9.8 3.168 12.6
R-squared  /  Adj.  Rsq 0.589 0.525 0.647 0.533 0.642 0.573 0.628 0.569 0.584 0.520 0.594 0.515 0.617 0.558
S.E.R. / S.S.R.  0.847                           
                 
                   
       







Log likelihood/DW  -44.3  1.87  -41.5 1.79 -41.7 1.83 -42.5 1.95 1.91 1.91 1.90
F-statistic / Prob (F) 
 
9.17  0.000 
 











   Method OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Notes:  For the basic data and model see Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  
REALINT is the real interest rate and is included as a macroeconomic control 
LIQSUP is where there was open-ended and extensive liquidity support to insolvent institutions 
FORB-A and FORB-B are two indicators of forbearabnce: Type A implies that banks were permitted to continue in operation despite open distress.   
Type B is a wider category including also eprisodes where other regulations, such as loan loss provisioning were relaxed or not enforced. 
GUAR means the government issued an explicit blanket guarantee to depositors or creditors 
The sample includes 38 episodes not including Argentina (I) and Egypt. 
Dependent variable is log(cost) with mean 1.583 and standard deviation 1.228.  The mean of GDPPCPPP is 10.1  
All explanatory variables included are shown.  
For estimation method 2SLS instruments for LIQSUP and GUAR are: CORRUPT, LAWORDER and (14) dummies for the date  
on which crises began..   
SER=Standard error of regression; SSR=Sum of squared residuals. 
 36Table 2:  Adding survey measures of supervision to the crisis cost regressions 
    Equation: G  H J K L M N
Variable                       
                             
Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat
REALINT 0.400 2.3 0.398 2.5 0.392 2.3 0.400 2.1 0.388 2.4 0.410 2.2 0.422 2.5
LIQSUP  0.954                           
                             
                             
                           
            
             
                 
              
                           
                             
2.8 1.143 3.3 1.150 3.3 1.096 2.6 0.952 2.8 0.864 2.2 0.908 2.5
FORB-A 0.868 2.5 0..881 2.9 0.853 2.5 0.736 1.9 0.744 1.9 0.530 1.4 0.479 1.1
FORB-B
 
0.976 2.2 0.782 1.7 0.822 1.9 1.075 2.4 0.996 2.3 1.302 2.3 1.243 2.2
GUAR 0.707 2.0 0.617
 
1.7 0.602 1.7 0.924 2.6 0.652 1.9 0.549 1.3 0.574 1.4
PCPOWER 0.019  0.3   -0.024
 
  0.3  -0.223
 
  1.5
SFDISCR 0.161  1.2 0.207  1.0 0.589  1.7
OSPOWER 0.048  0.6 0.043  0.5
PMINDEX
 
-0.115  1.0  -0.112  0.9
Constant 3.445 7.8 3.212 11.1 5.2 2.022 1.9 2.757 2.6 4.169 9.8 3.668 2.3
R-squared  /  Adj.  Rsq 0.575 0.488 0.585 0.496 0.586 0.478 0.476 0.341 0.573 0.482 0.605 0.492 0.610 0.474
S.E.R. / S.S.R.  0.868                           
                 
                   
           
21.8 0.842 19.9 0.857 19.8 0.963
 





Log likelihood/DW  -44.3  1.93  -39.8 2.07 -41.7 2.06 1.83 -41.1 1.90 2.61 2.55
F-statistic / Prob (F) 
 
6.55  0.000 
 











  Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes:  See note to Table 1 for brief explanation of the basic model and data based on Honohan and Klingebiel (2003).  
The last four variables are from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006).  PCPOWER is an index of supervisory powers related to prompt corrective action: its sign has been 
changed so that the higher this index the less intervention must be prompt.  SFDISCR is an index of supervisory discretion: the higher this index, the more forbearance. 
OSPOWER is an index of official supervisory powers.  PMINDEX is an index of measures to enhance the effectiveness of private monitoring.  These are all measured as of 
2001-2.  
For estimation method 2SLS instruments for LIQSUP and GUAR are: CORRUPT, LAWORDER and (14) dummies for the date  
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on which crises began..   
  






2. East Asia & Pacific 
3. Europe & Central Asia
4. Latin America & Caribbean
5. Middle East & North Africa 
6. South Asia
7. Sub-Saharan Africa 
0 .5 1 1.5
Offshore Deposits / Bank Deposits
The figure shows for each region the median, upper and lower quartile and range for the different 
countries in that region of the ratio of offshore bank deposits held by residents to onshore deposits.  
The data covers 132 countries and refers to 2004. Source: Calculated from data of International 
Financial Statistics and Bank for International Settlements .
 38Appendix 1:  Egypt: Upside-down accounting 
 
It’s not usually easy to detect aggressive and misleading accounting practices at banks 
from simply looking at their accounts.  The published accounts of the state-owned 
banks in Egypt however, displayed a distinctive pattern which suggests a pattern of 
“upside-down accounting” (de Juan, 2002), where loan-loss provisioning is 
determined residually in order to achieve a profit target.  Specifically, each of the four 
big state-owned banks which continue to dominate the Egyptian banking system 
today, though one was privatized in 2006, reported a very small profit each year in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s despite large loan-loss provisioning.  The pattern of their 
reported profits is only circumstantial evidence but it suggests that loan-loss 
provisions—probably the element of the accounts that offers the greatest absolute 
scope for accounting manipulation—was determined by a rule equating it with 
accounting profit before provisions in order to arrive at a small (close to zero) net 
profit. 
 
Thus, expressing the sum of profit before tax and loan-loss provisioning for each year 
as a percentage of year-end total assets for each of the four state banks for which this 
data was available in the Bankscope database (1994-2001) and plotting this measure 
of operating profit against loan loss provisioning as a percentage of total assets we 
find a close linear relationship (Figure 1).
1 A regression analysis gives the following 
result: 
 
Addition to Loan-loss Provisions = -0.45 + 0.99 Operating Profit 
       (4.5)   (15.2)  
RSQ=0.933; SEE=0.15. 
 
The equation indicates that, whatever the actual procedure for determining loan-loss 
provisioning, an excellent approximation is obtained by simply subtracting about 
0.45 percent of total assets from the operating profit for any given bank in any given 
year.  
 
In contrast, when we add three private banks for which data is available (from the 
rating agency Fitch), CIB, Al Watany and EAB they do not fit the pattern at all 
(Figure 2). For these private banks there is no obvious correlation between operating 
profit and provisioning.   
 
Despite official statements that loan-loss provisioning at the state banks followed best 
international practice and adhered to the regulations of the Central Bank of Egypt, this 
does suggest that the amounts set aside annually into loan-loss reserves were strongly 
influenced by the availability of operating profits.  The not unreasonable conclusion 
that a much higher level of provisioning was really needed was subsequently 
confirmed when, after a thorough change of senior management, there were sizable 








Figure A.1: Egypt: Operating Profit and Loan-Loss Provisioning at the Four Public 
Sector Commercial Banks 














Figure A.2: Egypt: Operating Profit and Loan-Loss Provisioning at the Four Public 
Sector Commercial Banks Plus 3 Available Private Banks 


















 40Appendix 2: A model of information, enforcement costs and forbearance 
 
Here is a simple model of regulatory discretion, where regulators seek to minimize 
the sum of enforcement costs (the pressures placed upon them by the regulated 
intermediaries trying to avoid the imposition of additional capital requirements) and 
their exposure to criticism for apparent forbearance in the case of failure. 
 
Imagine a bank operating in discrete time.  Each period t results in a new value of the 
bank’s capital.  The bank may be required to add capital in an interim period t+  
before continuing to operate. Suppose that bank insiders, regulators and the general 
public receive noisy signals about the condition of the bank and that each makes 
inferences about the capital (net present value of expected future streams) of the bank 
on the basis of these signals.  
 
To simplify things we will assume right away that bank insiders actually see the true 
capital position Kt of the bank in period t; their signal is not noisy.  However, the 
regulator does not see this, but observes Rt which we call regulatory capital and which 
is related to true capital by: 
Rt = Kt + εt. 
The fact that the regulator does not see the true capital means that capital may be 
much lower than the regulator thinks.  This can mean much higher risk being taken by 
the insiders that the regulator expects.    
 
Finally, the general public observes a different indicator Pt which is a noisy indicator 
of regulatory capital. 
Pt = Rt + υt. 
 
The public observes this indicator at all times – both before (t) and after (t+) 
enforcement as described below. 
 
If we take the disturbances εt and υt to be zero mean Gaussian, the quality of the 
regulator’s information and that of the public can be indexed by their standard 
deviations,  and   respectively.  
ε σ t
υ σt
  41 
We take it that the stated policy of bank regulation is the maintenance of a statutory 
minimum capital ratio γ and take the value of γ as predetermined and equivalent to 
what would be socially optimal in a world without information deficiencies as 




We consider two alternative enforcement regimes of capital adequacy.  One, the 
conventional type, in which enforcement is relative to the signal received by the 
regulator, and “bright line” regulation according to which enforcement is relative to 
the signal observed by the general public.  Like the minimum capital ratio γ, the 
regime is chosen in advance and cannot be influenced by the regulator.   With a 
conventional enforcement regime, he fact that the public do not see the regulator’s 
signal means that the regulator can forbear without the public being fully aware of 
this.  Given that political or other pressures from the bank insiders mean that 
requiring recapitalizations represents a costly policy for the regulator, the fact that 
forbearance can be concealed may influence the action of the regulator.  However, 
with bright line enforcement, forbearance is visible to all. 
 
Enforcement occurs after the signals are observed and takes the form of a required 
recapitalization, lifting capital to gt.  With a conventional regime, this means that, 
after enforcement, i.e. at time t+, Rt+  ≥  gt. (With bright line enforcement, Pt+  ≥  gt.). 
 
The size of recapitalization is xt = Max{0,  Rt  –  gt}  (xt =  Max{0,  Pt  – gt}); it is 
nonzero if and only if Rt  <  gt  (Pt  <  gt). 
 
We assume that the insiders have an incentive to minimize capital invested, and will 
distribute any surplus above required capital.  They will then make business decisions 
which contribute to the evolution of capital between time t+ and t+1.  We assume that 
Kt+1 = Kt+ + ut+1
where ut+1 is distributed Gaussian with mean zero and standard deviation    
assumed inversely related to K
u
t 1 + σ
t . 
 
  42We focus on the decisions of the regulator.  On the one hand, the regulator does not 
want the private sector to observe an incident of bank failure, defined as Pt+1 < 0, as 
this will be associated with social costs and private costs to the extent that the 
regulator is blamed for forbearance.  This we call the regulator’s exposure cost.  On 
the other hand, enforcement that involves a nonzero recapitalization requirement xt 
will trigger private costs on the regulator as bank insiders use political and other 
powers to influence the decision. These we will call the regulator’s enforcement cost. 




where the second term is the product of πt
F and πt
D,
 the probability of failure and the 
market’s inferred probability that the regulator has exercised forbearance (and as such 
is partly to blame for the failure).  For simplicity imagine the cost Y being additive in 
the enforcement and exposure costs. 
 
The first argument x of the loss function Y is thus the additional capital imposed and 
its inclusion reflects the pressure on the regulator from the bank shareholders. We 
could assume that there is a jump in the loss function at x = 0 (any forced 
recapitalization, however minimal, incurs the wrath of the shareholder) and that Y 
increases thereafter with x.  This cost does not depend on either of the information 
variances. It is illustrated in Figure A2.1. 
 
The probability of failure will depend not only on g  but on the uncertainty of the 
available information  .  Thus, the probability of failure, conditional on 
information available to the regulator at time t+, is 
ε σ t
πt
F = Prob {Pt+1 < 0}. 
     = Prob {Rt+1 + vt+1 < 0}. 
     = Prob {Kt+1 +εt+1+ vt+1 < 0}. 
     = Prob {Kt+ +ut+1+εt+1+ vt+1 < 0}. 
     = Prob {gt+εt+ut+1+εt+1+ vt+1 < 0}. 
The probability of failure thus depends not only on g but also on the variances: 
πt
F= Prob {gt –εt+ut+1+εt+1+ vt+1 < 0│ gt ,  , ,    }. 
u
t 1 + σ
ε σ t
ε σ 1 + t
υ σ 1 + t





F[gt,  ( g
u
t 1 + σ t – εt), σ
ε, σ
υ] 
  43Given that   depends on K
u
t 1 + σ t+ = gt – εt, the probability of failure depends negatively 










υ ε σ σ ε σ π , ), , ( , 1 +  < 0 
through two effects: a shift along the Gaussian distribution and a change in the 
variance.  These two effects are illustrated in Figure A2.2, which plots the cumulative 
distribution function of ut+1.  
 
The dependence of probability of failure on g is plotted in Figure A2.3 for different 
values of the information variances σ
ε, σ
υ. This shows the dependence on g as convex, 
as can be deduced from the Gaussian distributional assumption.  An increase in either 
variance increases the probability of failure. 
  
Finally, consider the inferred probability that forbearance was exercised, g<γ .  For 
simplicity we look only at the public’s inference from observing Pt+ ,  
Prob { gt<γ │ Pt+  } 
ignoring any additional information deduced from the later observation of Pt+1.  
While the latter is also informative, its information content is degraded by the new 
shocks ut+1, εt+1, and υt+1, whereas Pt+ = gt + υt+  so the inference is only complicated 
by one variance.  From this point of view, the simplifying assumption seems 
acceptable.  If the variance   is zero, inference is perfect, as shown in Figure A2.4.  
(After all, with full information on the part of the public, as with bright line 
regulation, any value of g below the statutory value makes the public certain that 
there was forbearance, any value above, makes the public certain that there was no 
forbearance.)  With finite variance   , inferring the enforced capital level R
υ σt
υ σt t+ = g  
simply from observation of Pt+ and the equation Rt+ = Pt+ + νt+  leads to a Gaussian 
distribution for Rt+, with the probability that forbearance has been exercised Prob{Rt+ 
< γ │Pt+ }= Prob{νt+ > Pt+ – γ} which selects a point on the cumulative Gaussian 
distribution of υt+.   If the variance is infinite, the posterior probability distribution of 
g is very dispersed.  Finally, conditional on the actual choice g, the expected value of 
this probability is an average of the above for values centred around Pt+ = g.  Thus, 
the inferred probability of forbearance is downward sloping in g, but in this case the 
  44dependence on 
υ σt  is not monotone.  These patterns are illustrated in Figure A2
more realistic formulation would build in a Bayesian prior distribution f
.4.  A 
or the 
ublic’s beliefs ut g, but the qualitative patterns would be the same.
’s exposure cost (i.e. the second 




ill, in these 
ircumstances, tend to increase the actual capital levels enforced. 
ing a 
 enforcement cost will tend to lower the enforced level of 
apital (Figure A2.5c).   
teeper, pushing 
e enforced capital level g up, even if enforcement costs are high.   
 enforced capital up 




The product of the two probabilities is the regulator
a
 
Putting together the enforcement and exposure costs, as in Figure A2.5a, shows the 
two-edged sword of information deficiencies.  Even if the regulator does impos
statutory capital requirement, lack of information by the public means that the 
regulator is still exposed to the risk that they may be blamed for a failure.  O
other hand, it is also true that if, faced with severe pressures from the bank 
shareholders, the regulator avoids imposing the full statutory capital ratio γ, the 
chances of this forbearance being suspected by the public may be low even in the 
event of failure.  So with low public information and severe pressures from bank 
shareholders, regulators will tend to impose too little capital.  Better informatio
the public (or almost equivalently, with bright line enforcement) w
c
 
To see this, consider the case where public information is weak (high 
υ σt ), giv
fairly flat exposure cost, and enforcement costs x are low both as to level and 
dependence on g.  In this case the regulator, driven only by enforcement costs and 
exposure risk, may even impose a higher than statutory capital requirement for fear 
that he will be wrongly blamed for forbearance (Figure A2.5b).  But with the same 
public information, a high
c
 
With better public information (low 
υ σt ), the exposure cost curve is s
th
 
Bright line enforcement works in a similar way, driving the
w









Figure A2.1: Enforcement cost of requirement g at different initial values of capital R 
High g 
Low g 
High g  Low g   
 
Figure A2.2: Cumulative distribution of change in capital u depends on enforced capital g
  46  47
 
 
















Prob failure low 
information 
Prob failure high 
information 




 (a) intermediate values of enforcement and exposure cost 
 
(b) low values of enforcement and exposure cost 
 
(c) High enforcement cost, low exposure cost 
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